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OPINION
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Maurice Duhaney petitions for review of the April 22, 2008,
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), finding
Duhaney removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony
under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) section
237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  This order of
removal was based on a 1985 conviction for criminal possession of
a weapon in the second degree, which Duhaney contends the
Government could have raised as a ground for removal during prior
immigration proceedings.  Having failed to charge him as
deportable based on this conviction during the prior proceedings,
he argues that the Government should have been precluded from
doing so in subsequent proceedings.  Duhaney also argues that the
BIA committed procedural error and deprived him of the right to
present arguments on his own behalf.  For the reasons set forth
below, we will deny the petition.
I.
Duhaney was born in Jamaica on November 12, 1965.  In
1973, at the age of seven, he was admitted to the United States as
a lawful permanent resident and has resided in the United States
ever since.  On September 11, 1985, a jury convicted Duhaney of
manslaughter in the second degree and criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree, based on the fatal shooting of
Vincent Santiago, Jr. (the “1985 shooting convictions”).  The jury
acquitted Duhaney of murder in the second degree and
manslaughter in the first degree.  Duhaney was sentenced to
consecutive terms of five to fifteen years for each conviction.
3While Duhaney was awaiting trial for these charges, he was
arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance with
the intent to sell.  On October 1, 1985, Duhaney pled guilty to
criminal sale of a controlled substance (the “1985 controlled
substance conviction”).  He was sentenced to one to three years in
prison.  Based on these three convictions, Duhaney remained
incarcerated until 1995.
On June 24, 1986, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) issued an Order to Show Cause (the “1986 OTSC”)
charging Duhaney as deportable pursuant to former INA section
241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) (1986), based on the 1985
controlled substance conviction.  Administrative Record (“A.R.”)
910.  The 1986 OTSC did not mention the 1985 shooting
convictions.  Id.  In response to the 1986 OTSC, Duhaney
submitted a Form I-191 requesting a waiver of deportation pursuant
to former INA section 212(c) in September 1992.  A.R. 905-06.  In
his application for a § 212(c) waiver, Duhaney disclosed all three
convictions.  A.R. 906.
In August 1993, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) held a hearing
on Duhaney’s request for a § 212(c) waiver.  The IJ asked the INS
attorney about the firearms conviction, and the INS attorney stated
his belief that the since the OTSC was issued before March 1,
1991, the firearms conviction could not be used as a basis for
deportability.  A.R. 369.  The INS attorney further noted, “I don’t
think we’d ever charge him, Judge, but the possibility exists that it
could be charged in the future.  I would hope that the Service
doesn’t do that.”  A.R. 370.  The IJ commented he would “leave
that for another day,” although he expressed “real reservations
about whether the Service could do that,” as the issue presented a
“res judicata question.”  Id.  The IJ accepted the INS attorney’s
representation that these other convictions did not render him
statutorily ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver.  Id.  In the oral decision
granting Duhaney’s request for a waiver, the IJ first noted that
Duhaney had admitted the allegations in the OTSC and conceded
that he was deportable.  A.R. 377.  The IJ discussed both the 1985
substance abuse conviction cited in the OTSC and the 1985
shooting convictions, noting that the manslaughter conviction
amounted to a crime involving moral turpitude.  A.R. 383-84
 During this time period, the Government issued an NTA,1
dated November 16, 2006, charging Duhaney as removable based
on his 1985 drug trafficking, manslaughter, and firearms
convictions.  A.R. 683-84.  This NTA was later dismissed as
“improvidently issued.”  A.R. 618.
4
(citing In re Wojtkow, 18 I. & N. Dec. 8411 (BIA 1981)).  The
Government elected not to appeal, and these first deportation
proceedings were terminated on August 20, 1993.  A.R. 425.
On March 24, 2000, Duhaney pled guilty to criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (the “2000
conviction”).  On March 25, 2004, the Government issued a Notice
to Appear (NTA) charging that the 2000 conviction rendered him
removable on two grounds:  (1) as a conviction for a crime relating
to a controlled substance under INA section 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); and (2) as a conviction of an aggravated
felony under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which is defined to include a drug trafficking
crime under INA section 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B)
(the “2004 NTA”).  A.R. 931.  In October 2004, an IJ ordered
Duhaney removed based on the 2000 conviction.  A.R. 746-48.  In
January 2005, the BIA affirmed this removal order, making it the
final agency determination (the “2005 removal order” or the “2005
removal proceedings”).  A.R. 752.
On August 9, 2006, the New York Supreme Court vacated
the 2000 conviction and dismissed the indictment with prejudice.
A.R. 440.  Thereafter, Duhaney filed a pro se motion with the BIA
to reopen and terminate the 2005 removal proceedings; the BIA
received the motion on December 4, 2006.   A.R. 695-706.  On1
December 5, 2006, the Government also moved to reopen the 2005
removal proceedings.  A.R. 688-90.  The Government’s motion
acknowledged that Duhaney was no longer removable based on the
now-vacated 2000 conviction, but the motion stated the
Government’s belief that Duhaney “may be removable . . . on the
basis of other, separate and distinct criminal convictions.”  A.R.
690.  The Government requested that the BIA “remand this matter
to the Immigration Court so that it may reopen and terminate the
 We refer to the Form I-261 itself as the “2007 Form,” and2
we refer to this form together with the 2004 NTA that it
supplemented as the “Amended 2004 NTA.”  The 2007 Form, on
its own, does not constitute a separate charging document.  It
merely adds factual allegations and charges of removability to the
2004 NTA.
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aforementioned Removal Proceedings . . . and rescind the
aforementioned Order of Removal.”  Id.  The Government’s
motion also included the following caveat:  “all of the foregoing
without prejudice against the initiation of any new removal
proceedings, so that DHS-ICE may prepare and file a new NTA
against the Respondent.”  Id. 
Duhaney claims that he did not receive the Government’s
motion.  Throughout this time period, Duhaney was in the
Government’s custody.  On November 17, 2006, the Government
transferred Duhaney from a detention facility in New York to a
correctional center in Pennsylvania.  Duhaney’s motion included
a cover letter listing his address as the Pennsylvania facility, A.R.
695, but the BIA’s filing receipt lists his address as the New York
facility, A.R. 693.  The Government served its motion by sending
it via first class mail to the New York facility.  A.R. 690.
On January 17, 2007, the BIA granted the parties’ motions
to reopen and remanded the matter to the Immigration Court for
further proceedings.  A.R. 617.  On March 6, 2007, the
Government filed a Form I-261, lodging additional charges of
removability against Duhaney (the “2007 Form”).   A.R. 600-01.2
Specifically, the 2007 Form charged Duhaney with removability
pursuant to:  INA section 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C),
based on his conviction for a firearms offense; INA section
237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), based on his
convictions for two crimes of moral turpitude; and INA section
237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), based on his
conviction for an aggravated felony.  A.R. 600.  The 2007 Form
detailed his 1985 manslaughter, firearms possession, and sale of a
controlled substance convictions; reported that his 2000 conviction
had been vacated; and acknowledged that he had been granted a §
6212(c) waiver based on an application that listed all three 1985
convictions.  A.R. 600-01.
In response, Duhaney filed a motion to terminate the
removal proceedings.  A.R. 503-09.  Duhaney argued, inter alia,
that DHS failed to provide him notice of its motion to reopen, that
the BIA erred by remanding the case to the IJ rather than simply
terminating the removal proceedings, and that the Government was
barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata from charging
grounds of removability that it could have charged during the prior
proceedings that were closed in 1993 and 2005.  A.R. 504-08.
On November 5, 2007, the IJ denied Duhaney’s motion to
terminate.  A.R. 444-52.  The IJ noted that collateral estoppel and
res judicata apply generally to immigration proceedings, but that
neither doctrine precluded DHS from alleging new grounds for
removability in this case.  A.R. 449.  The IJ concluded that
“[u]nder the INA as it was applied when [Duhaney] was granted a
waiver under section 212(c) . . . , the former INS could not have
charged [him] with removal as an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony,” because the aggravated felony provisions of the
Immigration Act of 1990 did not apply retroactively until the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 was enacted.  A.R. 450.  Based on this “material intervening
change in the governing law,” the IJ found that “neither res judicata
nor collateral estoppel would bar DHS’s prosecution of removal
proceedings based on his 1985 weapon conviction.”  A.R. 451.
The IJ also determined that Duhaney’s § 212(c) waiver applied
only to the basis for removability alleged at that time, and not to a
basis for removability – Duhaney’s conviction of an aggravated
felony – that did not even exist at the time.  A.R. 451.
On December 20, 2007, the IJ ordered Duhaney removed to
Jamaica based on the three grounds added by the 2007 Form.  A.R.
58-63.  Duhaney appealed the IJ’s decision, A.R. 9-29, and on
April 22, 2008, the BIA affirmed the removal order, A.R. 2-6.  The
BIA rejected Duhaney’s arguments that it erred by remanding the
case to the IJ, that Duhaney’s due process rights were violated by
his failure to receive notice of the Government’s motion, and that
collateral estoppel and res judicata barred the Government from
adding charges that it could have charged before.  A.R. 4-5.  On
7May 7, 2008, Duhaney filed this timely petition for review.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this petition under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(1).  Since Duhaney was found removable based on his
conviction for an aggravated felony, we review only the legal and
constitutional issues raised.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); see
Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We have
jurisdiction to review constitutional claims or questions of law
raised upon a petition for review from a final order of the BIA . .
. .”).  We exercise de novo review over these issues.  See Caroleo,
476 F.3d at 162 (citing Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211
(3d Cir. 2005)). 
III.
As a threshold matter, Duhaney argues that the BIA erred by
remanding his case to the IJ rather than simply reopening the
proceedings for the sole purpose of terminating the order of
removal.  He argues that the BIA disregarded its own established
precedent by remanding the case, and that he was deprived of the
right to oppose remand because the Government failed to provide
proper notice.
A.
Duhaney first contends that the BIA erred by remanding
rather than terminating his case upon the vacatur of his conviction,
relying on Johnson v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“Johnson (2d Cir.)”).  In that case, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit noted that the “BIA, as a matter of practice,
routinely reopens and terminates proceedings of this kind without
remanding for further inquiry before an IJ.”  Id. (citing In re
Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1378, 1380 (BIA 2000); In re
Gutnick, 13 I. & N. Dec. 672, 674 (BIA 1971)).  The court also
noted that, since the Government did not intend to introduce any
previously unavailable evidence on remand, “the Board’s own
precedents clearly mandated” that the Government’s motion to
remand be denied.  Id. (citing Kuang-Te Wang v. Ashcroft, 260
8F.3d 448, 451 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec.
464, 471-73 (BIA 1992)).  The court concluded that, “[w]hile the
Board is free to modify its precedents in a reasoned fashion, it acts
arbitrarily and unlawfully when it simply ignores established
holdings.”  Id. at 171 (citing Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286
F.3d 696, 700 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Johnson (3d Cir.)”)).
We have recognized that an administrative agency “acts
arbitrarily if it departs from its established precedents without
announcing a principled reason for the departure.”  Johnson (3d
Cir.), 286 F.3d at 700 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  We
disagree, however, that the BIA disregarded established precedent
by remanding these proceedings to the IJ.  We do not view any of
the cases cited in Johnson (2d Cir.) as establishing that the BIA’s
established precedent is to terminate removal proceedings without
remand to the IJ.  While the BIA terminated removal proceedings
without first remanding to an IJ in both Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N.
Dec. at 1380, and Gutnick, 13 I. & N. Dec. at 674, these two
examples do not prove that this procedure amounts to the BIA’s
established precedent.
If anything, the applicable regulations seem to contemplate
the procedure that the BIA followed in this case.  Under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), the BIA generally “will not engage in
factfinding in the course of deciding appeals.”  If “factfinding is
needed in a particular case, the Board may remand the proceeding
to the immigration judge . . . .”  Id.  In Coelho, the BIA discussed
the requirements for a motion to remand, explaining that such
motions are “not expressly addressed” by the INA but have become
“an accepted part” of the agency’s procedure.  20 I. & N. Dec. at
471.  When a motion to remand also requires reopening closed
proceedings, the motion must comply with the requirements for a
motion to reopen.  Id.  Accordingly, remand is generally only
appropriate for “consideration of new facts or changed
circumstances.”  Wang, 260 F.3d at 451.  Coelho and Wang merely
recognize that remand is generally inappropriate without new
factual circumstances.
In this case, the vacatur of Duhaney’s 2000 conviction
9presented the BIA with new facts to consider, allowing it to grant
the parties’ motions to reopen and to remand to the IJ to evaluate
the impact of these new facts.  Once the BIA had remanded the
case to the IJ, BIA precedent authorized the IJ to consider “any and
all matters” that the IJ “deem[ed] appropriate in the exercise of his
administrative discretion.”  In re Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec. 600, 601
(BIA 1978).  Under these circumstances, the BIA did not disregard
its established precedent by remanding the case in a way that
ultimately permitted the Government to lodge additional charges of
removability against Duhaney.  Accordingly, the BIA did not err in
ordering a remand.
B.
Duhaney also argues that the Government failed to provide
notice of its motion to reopen, which it sent to a detention facility
in New York after he had been transferred to a correctional center
in Pennsylvania.  In particular, he claims that he was deprived of
the opportunity to make arguments on his own behalf and that he
suffered prejudice as a result, in violation of his right to due
process.  See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir.
2007) (“Where an alien claims a denial of due process because he
was prevented from making his case to the BIA or the IJ, he must
show (1) that he was prevented from reasonably presenting his case
and (2) that substantial prejudice resulted.” (quotation marks,
citation, and footnote omitted)).  We disagree with Duhaney’s
claim.
Both parties filed motions to reopen the proceedings based
on the vacatur of Duhaney’s 2000 conviction.  A.R. 689-90
(Government’s motion), 698-706 (Duhaney’s motion).  Without
hearing any additional arguments from either party, the BIA
granted the relief sought by both parties.  A.R. 617 (granting
motion to reopen because “[t]he respondent and the Department of
Homeland Security, in separate motions, ask that we reopen
proceedings on the grounds that the criminal conviction underlying
the respondent’s removal order has been vacated”).  Again, both
parties sought and received identical relief.  We reject Duhaney’s
argument that he suffered any type of prejudice under these
circumstances.  Accordingly, the BIA did not deprive Duhaney of
 We note, however, that under the analysis we apply to the3
original proceedings, res judicata would not have barred the
Government from filing a new NTA based on the charges lodged
in the 2004 Form had the BIA merely terminated the proceedings.
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his due process rights.
IV.
Having addressed Duhaney’s argument that the BIA
committed procedural error, we turn to his substantive challenges
to the removal order.  His principal claim is that res judicata
precluded the Government from adding additional charges to the
2004 NTA based on convictions that it could have used to support
charges of removability during prior immigration proceedings.
Duhaney argues that two separate proceedings should have
preclusive effect:  (1) the original proceedings, based on the 1986
OTSC, which terminated with the grant of a § 212(c) waiver; and
(2) the 2004 proceedings, which he argues should have been
terminated when his 2000 conviction was vacated.  Since we have
determined that the BIA did not err by remanding the proceedings
in a way that permitted the Government to lodge additional charges
of removability, only the first proceeding achieved the finality
necessary to invoke res judicata.   We hold that the Government3
was not precluded from alleging new charges of removability
following the vacatur of Duhaney’s 2000 conviction.
A.
Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars a party
from initiating a second suit against the same adversary based on
the same “cause of action” as the first suit.  See In re Mullarkey,
536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).  A party seeking to invoke res
judicata must establish three elements:  “(1) a final judgment on the
merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies
and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.”  Id.
(quotation marks omitted).  “The doctrine of res judicata bars not
only claims that were brought in a previous action, but also claims
that could have been brought.”  Id.
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Although the doctrine of res judicata is most frequently
applied to final judgments issued by courts, we have also endorsed
its application to adjudicative determinations by administrative
agencies, including certain immigration decisions.  The Supreme
Court has instructed that the “common-law doctrines of collateral
estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims)” should be
applied “to those determinations of administrative bodies that have
attained finality.”  Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino,
501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991).  “‘When an administrative agency is
acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact
properly before it which the parties have had an adequate
opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res
judicata to enforce repose.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Utah
Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)).  Since the
common law principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata are
“well established,” courts may imply that “Congress has legislated
with an expectation that the principle will apply except when a
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”  Id. at 108 (quotation
marks omitted).
Applying this framework, we have held that common law
preclusion doctrines apply to adjudicative agency determinations
under the INA, as long as application of these doctrines “does not
frustrate congressional intent or impede the effective functioning
of the agency.”  Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 387-88 (3d
Cir. 2006).  In Duvall, we explained that these preclusion doctrines
apply to “all proceedings that may be deemed ‘adjudicative,’ no
matter whether the governing entity is a ‘court’ or an ‘agency.’”
Id. at 390.  We further explained that “[t]he adversarial system of
dispute resolution established in the INA is plainly adjudicatory in
character and susceptible to full application of common law
principles of preclusion.”  Id.  Since “[r]equiring the INS to meet
its burden of proof at a single hearing is consistent with the
statutory scheme, as interpreted by the administrative agency, and
will not frustrate the goals of Congress,” the “‘lenient presumption
in favor of administrative estoppel’ holds, and the INA will be held
to incorporate common law principles of collateral estoppel.”  Id.
(citing In re Federenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 61 (BIA 1984) and
quoting Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108).
 Although this general principle appears well settled, at4
least one court of appeals has expressed the possibility that res
judicata may not apply in the specific context of efforts to remove
aliens convicted of aggravated felonies.  See Channer v. DHS, 527
F.3d 275, 280 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008).  The court in Channer explained
that “a doctrine of repose should not be applied so as to frustrate
clearly expressed congressional intent,” and that Congress has
“repeatedly and unambiguously . . . sought to remove . . . aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies.”  Id.  The court therefore
suggested that the removal of aliens who have committed
aggravated felonies may be a special case:  “It may be that when
DHS attempts to remove aliens convicted of aggravated felonies --
as opposed to aliens falling into some other category making them
removable -- the determination of whether res judicata applies
changes, given Congress’ clear and emphatic position with respect
to such aliens.”  Id.
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The parties in this case do not dispute the general
proposition that res judicata may be applied to adjudicative
proceedings under the INA.   The question is whether res judicata4
precluded the Government from lodging new charges of
removability under these particular circumstances.  As previously
noted, res judicata only applies to a second proceeding based on the
same “cause of action” as the first.  The challenge in this case, as
in many res judicata cases, is defining the relevant “cause of
action.”
We have disavowed attempts to create a “simple test” for
“determining what constitutes a cause of action for res judicata
purposes.”  Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d
Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted).  “Rather, we look toward the
‘essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the
various legal claims.’”  Id. (quoting Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply,
688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc)).  Our approach reflects
the “‘present trend . . . of requiring that a plaintiff present in one
suit all the claims for relief that he may have arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence.’”  Id. (quoting United States v.
Athlone Indus., Inc., 46 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)).  Under this
transactional approach, the focus of the inquiry is “‘whether the
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acts complained of were the same, whether the material facts
alleged in each suit were the same, and whether the witnesses and
documentation required to prove such allegations were the same.’”
Id. (quoting Athlone, 746 F.2d at 984).  “A mere difference in
theory is not dispositive.”  Id. 
Duhaney proposes that the relevant “‘transaction’ for res
judicata purposes in removal proceedings is the alien’s
removability.”  Duhaney Br. 21.  He contends that “[w]hether the
alien is removable on the basis of criminal offenses is essentially
a single transaction:  certainly, the issue of an alien’s removability
on the basis of multiple convictions form a convenient trial unit
and conforms to the parties’ expectations.”  Id.  The Government
proposes that in the removal context, the relevant transaction
should be defined as the “factual occurrence or conviction upon
which a charge of removability is based.”  Att’y Gen. Br. 34.
We conclude that the Government’s approach to defining
the relevant cause of action is more faithful to our res judicata
precedent and the equitable principles underlying the doctrine, to
say nothing of congressional intent.  In this case, the Government
secured a removal order against Duhaney based on criminal
convictions for which it had not previously charged Duhaney as
removable.  Although there are common elements of fact between
the two removal proceedings, the critical acts and the necessary
documentation were different for the two proceedings.
Accordingly, we hold that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar
the Government from lodging additional charges of removability
after Duhaney’s 2000 conviction was vacated.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has applied a
similar transactional approach to defining the relevant cause of
action.  Channer v. DHS, 527 F.3d 275, 281-82 (2d Cir. 2008).  In
Channer, the petitioner was convicted of state and federal crimes
arising out of two separate incidents:  a federal charge of carrying
a firearm during a drug trafficking crime and state charges of
robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery.  The
INS initially charged him as removable based solely on the federal
conviction, which it contended amounted to both an aggravated
felony and a removable firearms offense under the INA.  After an
14
IJ had entered an order of removal, however, the petitioner’s
federal conviction was vacated, and, based on the INS’s motion,
his removal was terminated.  The INS then initiated new removal
proceedings against him, charging him as removable based on his
state convictions, which amounted to aggravated felonies under the
INA.  The petitioner argued that this second proceeding was barred
by res judicata, but the BIA and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the second proceeding involved a different
“cause of action” from the first.  Id. at 278, 281-82.  The court in
Channer reasoned that the two proceedings “did not originate from
the same nucleus of operative fact.  The factual predicates
produced two distinct convictions based on different charges.”  Id.
at 281. The court continued that “[w]hile the remedy for each claim
is identical -- deportation for committing an aggravated felony --
the contrasting evidence required to prove each claim and the
different elements of each crime demonstrate that they do not form
a convenient trial unit.”  Id.  The court rejected Channer’s claim
that res judicata should apply because “the facts essential to the
second suit existed and were known to the complaining party at the
time of the first,” reasoning that “each deportation proceeding
stemmed from a separate transaction” and “each required different
proof.”  Id.  The court concluded that res judicata did not bar the
Government from lodging new charges of removability based on
a different predicate conviction.
In Bravo-Pedroza v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir.
2007), by contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
determined that “elementary fairness” required the opposite result.
Id. at 1360.  In that case, the Government first sought to deport
Bravo-Pedroza based on a 1985 conviction for robbery and a 1986
conviction for burglary.  The IJ found him deportable but granted
him relief under former INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1990).
Bravo-Pedrazo, 475 F.3d at 1359.  The Government sought to
deport him for a second time in 2001, based on a 1996 conviction
for petty theft that, due to his prior offenses, amounted to an
aggravated felony.  Id.  The IJ found Bravo-Pedroza removable, but
while his petition for review was pending, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that petty theft did not amount to an
aggravated felony; it therefore remanded Bravo’s petition to the
BIA.  Id.  A few days later, the Government filed new charges of
15
removability against him, alleging that his three prior convictions
were crimes of moral turpitude.  Id.  The IJ upheld the charges, but
the Court of Appeals granted Bravo-Pedroza’s petition for review,
concluding that res judicata barred the Government from
relitigating Bravo-Pedroza’s removability based on these three
prior convictions.  Id.  at 1359-60.  The court held that the
Government was barred by res judicata from “initiating a second
deportation case on the basis of a charge that [it] could have
brought in the first case, when, due to a change of law that
occurred during the course of the first case, [it] lost the first case.”
Id. at 1358.  The court rejected the Government’s argument that res
judicata should be applied “flexibly” in this context, explaining that
the agency’s own regulations provided an opportunity to add
charges “during the pendency of immigration proceedings,” but not
after a proceeding had concluded.  Id. at 1359-60 (emphasis in
original).  The Government had “abundant opportunity” to add
these charges to the prior proceedings, the court determined, and
having neglected this opportunity, it could not “avoid the
application of the general principles of res judicata.”  Id. at 1360.
The court concluded that “elementary fairness” supported
the petitioner’s res judicata defense, but it did not address whether
the second proceedings involved the same cause of action as the
first.  We are not persuaded that principles of fairness necessarily
support application of res judicata in the circumstances present
herein.  In any event, we see no reason to depart from our standard
res judicata analysis, including the transactional approach to
defining the relevant cause of action.
Duhaney argues that we should not consider the predicate
conviction to be the relevant factual transaction because the facts
underlying a conviction may not generally be litigated in removal
proceedings.  See Duhaney Br. 21 n.5 (arguing that under the
“formal categorical approach,” the “underlying facts of the criminal
convictions generally may not be litigated” (citing Evanson v. Att’y
Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 290 (3d Cir. 2008)). Although an IJ’s ability
to look beyond the elements of the crime charged may be limited,
the emphasis of the IJ’s analysis remains whether a particular
conviction amounts to a removable offense.  We conclude that the
most reasonable definition of the relevant transaction is the factual
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occurrence giving rise to a charge of removability.  See Channer,
527 F.3d at 281 (“While the remedy for each claim is identical --
deportation for committing an aggravated felony -- the contrasting
evidence required to prove each claim and the different elements
of each crime demonstrate that they do not form a convenient trial
unit”).  In this case, the relevant factual occurrence is the
conviction or convictions giving rise to a charge of removability.
Since the instant removal order was based on an aggravated felony
conviction arising from criminal conduct that the Government had
not previously charged as a ground for removal, these new charges
represent a new “cause of action.”
Our precedent in other, related areas supports this
conclusion.  In a case where we rejected an alien’s attempt to
invoke judicial estoppel to block the Government from lodging
additional charges of removability, we explained that “‘there is no
requirement that the [DHS] advance every conceivable basis for
[removability] in the [Notice to Appear] . . . .  [S]uch a rule would
needlessly complicate proceedings in the vast majority of cases.’”
Yong Wong Park v. Att’y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 73 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quoting De Faria v. INS, 13 F.3d 422, 424 (1st Cir. 1993)
(modifications in Park)).
We adopted a similarly pragmatic view of the Government’s
immigration charging discretion in Duvall.  Despite our general
conclusion that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to
immigration proceedings, we ultimately concluded that the
Government was not precluded from relitigating the issue of the
petitioner’s alienage, even though that issue technically had been
adjudicated on the merits in the first proceeding.  In the initial
deportation proceedings, the Government -- through an oversight
the court characterized as a mere “litigation error” -- failed to
produce proof of the petitioner’s foreign citizenship.  Duvall, 436
F.3d at 384.  After these initial deportation proceedings were
terminated in the petitioner’s favor, she went on to commit several
additional crimes.  When the Government sought to remove her
based on these subsequent convictions, she attempted to invoke
collateral estoppel to bar the Government from relitigating the issue
of her alienage.  We held that collateral estoppel did not bar the
Government from relitigating this issue under these circumstances,
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reasoning that “collateral estoppel was borne of equity and is
therefore ‘flexible,’ bending to satisfy its underlying purpose in
light of the nature of the proceedings.”  Id. at 390-91 (quoting Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 288 F.3d 519, 528
(3d Cir. 2002)). 
The case for applying equitable preclusion doctrines flexibly
is particularly strong in the circumstances presented by Duhaney’s
petition.  As we explained in Duvall, Congress has repeatedly
amended the immigration laws to facilitate the removal of aliens
who have been convicted of aggravated felonies.  436 F.3d at 391
(noting that a “primary goal of several recent overhauls of the INA
has been to ensure and expedite the removal of aliens convicted of
serious crimes” (citations omitted)); see also Channer, 527 F.3d at
280 n.4 (observing that Congress has “repeatedly and
unambiguously” sought to remove aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies).  “[A] doctrine of repose should not be applied so as to
frustrate clearly expressed congressional intent.”  Channer, 527
F.3d at 280 n.4.  The fact that Congress has specifically chosen to
amend the immigration laws to facilitate the removal of aliens who
have committed aggravated felonies counsels against an overly
rigid application of the res judicata doctrine.
In this case, the order of removal against Duhaney is based
on a ground of removability that did not even become available
until after Duhaney was granted a § 212(c) waiver.  The BIA found
him removable under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as
defined in INA section 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
INA section 101(a)(43)(F) defines aggravated felony as a crime of
violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.
This definition of aggravated felony was not created until after
1985, however, and Congress did not provide for the retroactive
application of the definition until it passed the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.  IIRIRA section 321(b)
amended INA section 101(a)(43) to apply the definition of
aggravated felony “regardless of whether the conviction was
entered before, on, or after the date of enactment of this
paragraph.”  110 Stat. at 3009-628 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
 Duhaney also argues that the Government’s attempts to5
initiate new removal proceedings against him based on charges that
it could have brought in earlier proceedings violate due process.
Without some procedural bar to limit the Government from
bringing successive actions, Duhaney argues, it “could simply
institute repeated administrative proceedings, imposing more and
more expense on its target, until it achieved its desired result.”
Duhaney Br. 47.  The doctrines of res judicata and procedural
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1101(a)(43)).
When the original immigration proceedings terminated with
the grant of a § 212(c) waiver in 1993, three years before IIRIRA
was passed, the Government could not have charged Duhaney with
removability based on this ground.  Other courts of appeals have
held that res judicata does not bar the Government from lodging
new charges of removability, post-IIRIRA, that could not have
been raised pre-IIRIRA.  See, e.g., Ljutica v. Holder, 588 F.3d 119,
127 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Under the principles of res judicata, while a
previous judgment may preclude litigation of claims that arose
prior to its entry, it cannot be given the effect of extinguishing
claims which did not even then exist and which could not possibly
have been sued upon in the previous case.” (quotation marks
omitted)); Alvear-Velez v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir.
2008) (“[A]lthough changes in case law almost never provide a
justification for instituting a new action arising from the same
dispute that already has been litigated to a final judgment, statutory
changes that occur after the previous litigation has concluded may
justify a new action.”).  
Since we have determined that the instant order of removal
is based on a different “cause of action” than the earlier
proceedings against Duhaney, we need not resolve whether the
enactment of new statutory grounds of removal would render res
judicata inapplicable.  Neither must we address Duhaney’s
contention that the Government could have used his 1985 firearm
and manslaughter convictions to support other potential grounds of
removal.  Under the circumstances presented by this case, res
judicata does not bar the Government from lodging new charges of
removability based on convictions that it had not previously raised.5
estoppel, as well as the BIA’s own procedures, however, impose
significant limits on the Government’s ability to bring successive
removal actions.  These doctrines and procedures impose
principled limits on the Government’s ability to revisit claims and
issues that have already been fully litigated, even if these doctrines
do not bar the Government from lodging new charges of
removability in this particular case.  Duhaney’s due process
challenge therefore lacks merit.
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B.
Duhaney contends that the regulations governing § 212(c)
waivers support his position that the Government was precluded
from lodging new charges of removal based on convictions
disclosed in his application for § 212(c) relief.  The Government
contends that this argument was waived because it was not
specifically raised before the IJ and the BIA.  Duhaney contends
that this specific issue falls within his broader claim that the
Government was precluded from relitigating claims that it could
have brought during earlier proceedings.  Assuming, arguendo, that
Duhaney has properly exhausted this issue, we conclude that his §
212(c) waiver does not apply to the instant order of removal, which
is based on a different ground of removability.
A § 212(c) waiver extends only to the “specific grounds of
excludability or deportability that were described in the
application.”  8 C.F.R. § 212.3(d).  The sole charge in the 1986
OTSC was based on his 1985 controlled substance conviction,
making him deportable under former INA section 242(a)(11), 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) (1986).  A.R. 910.  It did not raise any other
grounds for deportability.  Duhaney’s application for the § 212(c)
waiver disclosed his other convictions, A.R. 906, and the IJ
discussed these convictions in the hearing on Duhaney’s request for
the waiver, see A.R. 369-70, but the disclosure and discussion of
these convictions does not somehow bring every possible ground
for deportation that could have been based on the convictions
within the scope of the waiver.  
The BIA has explained that a § 212(c) waiver “should
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remain valid indefinitely,” but only as to specific “grounds stated
at the time of the grant of relief.”  In re Balderas, 20 I. & N. Dec.
389, 393 (BIA 1991).  In Balderas, the BIA further explained that
“since a grant of section 212(c) relief ‘waives’ the finding of
excludability itself, the crimes alleged to be grounds for
excludability or deportability do not disappear from the alien’s
record for immigration purposes.”  Id. at 391.  “[W]hen section
212(c) relief is granted, the Attorney General does not issue a
pardon or expungement of the conviction itself.  Instead, the
Attorney General grants the alien relief upon a determination that
a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted on the particular
facts presented, notwithstanding the alien’s excludability or
deportability.”  Id. (footnote omitted).
The facts of Balderas help illuminate this distinction.  The
INS first sought to deport Balderas based on two convictions,
under the former INA section 241(a)(4)(A), which applied to an
alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude.  Balderas
received a § 212(c) waiver, but he was later convicted of another
crime involving moral turpitude.  The INS then sought to deport
Balderas a second time, based on one of the pre-waiver convictions
and the post-waiver conviction, under the same “two crimes
involving turpitude” provision.  The BIA concluded that Balderas’
§ 212(c) waiver did not apply to this new basis for deportability,
holding that:
a conviction which has once been relied upon in a
charge of deportability may be alleged as one of the
‘two crimes involving moral turpitude’ in a second
proceeding, even though the first proceeding was
terminated by a grant of relief under section 212(c)
of the Act, where the second crime alleged is a
subsequent conviction that was not disclosed in the
prior proceeding.
Id. at 393.
Although Balderas involved an alien who committed
another crime after obtaining a § 212(c) waiver, the second
proceeding relied both on the post-waiver conviction and one of the
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pre-waiver convictions.  This fact illustrates that the scope of a §
212(c) waiver is defined by the basis for deportability, not the
underlying crime itself.  See Esquivel v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 919,
922 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The BIA has established that a § 212(c)
waiver does not waive the basis for excludability itself; it merely
waives the finding of excludability.” (emphasis in original)).
Indeed, we have determined, relying on Balderas, that the fact that
a petitioner’s deportation based on a particular conviction has been
waived does not prevent subsequent consideration of the same
underlying conviction for other purposes.  Rodriguez-Munoz v.
Gonzales, 419 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[E]ven if
Rodriguez-Munoz’s deportation based on his 1992 conviction were
waived under § 212(c), that conviction would nonetheless remain
an aggravated felony for purposes of precluding his application for
cancellation of removal under § 240A.”); see also De Hoyos v.
Mukasey, 551 F.3d 339, 342-43 (5th Cir. 2008) (agreeing with the
BIA’s approach in Balderas); Esquivel, 543 F.3d at 922-23 (same).
Duhaney obtained discretionary relief that allowed him to
remain in the country even though he was found to be deportable
based on his 1985 conviction for sale of a controlled substance.
This § 212(c) waiver remains valid indefinitely, but it applies only
to the basis for deportation charged in the 1986 OTSC.  Under the
applicable regulations, the Government was permitted to lodge new
charges of removability, even based on convictions that were
disclosed in his application.  Duhaney’s § 212(c) waiver does not
extend to the ground for removability that underlies the instant
order of removal.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for
review.
